State v. Stewart Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 36116 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
8-6-2009
State v. Stewart Appellant's Brief Dckt. 36116
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Stewart Appellant's Brief Dckt. 36116" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 907.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/907
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 361 16 
v. 
CLIFFORD STEWART, APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CASSIA 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. CRABTREE 
District Judge 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of ldaho 
I.S.B. # 4843 
SARA B. THOMAS 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. # 5867 
SARAH E. TOMPKINS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. # 7901 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii 
................................................................................ STATEMENT OF THE CASE I 
..................................................................................... Nature of the Case I 
Statement of the Facts and 
............................................................................... Course of Proceedings 2 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ....................................................................... 8 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 9 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Stewart's Motion 
.......................................................... To Dismiss The Felony Stalking Charge 9 
A. Introduction .......................................................................................... 9 
B. Standard Of Review ................................................................................... 9 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Stewart's Motion 
To Dismiss The Charge Of Felony Stalking Because This 
Charge Constituted A Violation Of The Fifth Amendment 
Prohibition Against Prosecuting A Person Twice For The Same 
Offense, And, In Absence Of The Course Of Conduct For Which 
Mr. Stewart Had Previously Been Tried And Sentenced, There 
Was No Proof Of A Course Of Conduct As Required For A 
Conviction Of Felony Stalking .................................................................. I 0  
1. The Unit Of Prosecution For The Offense Of Stalking Is A 
"Course Of Conduct", Which By Definition Requires Multiple 
Acts That Are Temporally Connected, And The Only Course 
Of Conduct Alleged By The State In This Case Is A Single 
.Act Coupled With The Prior Course Of Conduct For Which 
Mr. Stewart Had Previously Been Prosecuted .................................... 10 
2. Prosecuting Mr. Stewart A Second Time For The Course 
Of Conduct That Formed The Basis Of His Prior Stalking 
Conviction Violates The Fifth Amendment Prohibition 
Against Prosecuting A Defendant A Second Time For An 
Offense For Which The Defendant Has Already Been 
Sentenced ........................................................................................... 15 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 20 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 21 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Brown v . Ohio. 432 U.S. 161 (1977) ................................................................... ?4 
Edge v . Commonwealth. 883 N.E.2d 928 (Mass . 2008) ..................................... 18 
Eichelberger v . State. 949 So.2d 358 (Fla . Dist . Ct . App . 2007) ......................... 14 
.................................................................. Illinois v . Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980) 15 
Kinney v . State, 477 S.E.2d 843 (Ga . Ct . App . 1996) ......................................... 18 
.................................................................. Sanabria v . U . S.. 437 U.S. 54 (1 978) I 0  
State v . Bryant. 127 Idaho 24, 896 P.2d 350 (Ct . App . 1995) .............................. 9 
Sfate v . Bush. 131 Idaho 22, 951 P.2d 1249 (1997) ............................................. 9 
State v . Major, 111 Idaho 410. 725 P.2d 115 (1986) ........................................... 13 
State v . Vigil, 65 S.W.3d 26. 35-36 (Tenn . Crim . App . 2001) .............................. 18 
Vazquez v . Sfafe. 953 So.2d 569 (Fla . Dist . Ct . App . 2007) ............................. 1 8  
.................................................................. Whalen v . U . S.. 445 U.S. 684 (1 980) 17 
................................................. Woellhaf v . People. 105 P.3d 209 (Colo . 2005) 1 0  
Statutes 
.................................................................................................. I . C. § 18-7905 1 0  
I.C. § 18-7905(1) ................................................................................................. 17 
I.C. § 18-7906(1) ................................................................................................. I 0  
................................................................................................. . I C. 3 18-7906(2) I I 
.............................................................................................. lC . 3 18-7906(2)(a) 20
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case presents a question of first impression for this Court's resolution - 
whether it violates the Fifth Amendment protection against being placed in jeopardy 
twice for the same offense where the State alleges a single act, coupled with a course 
of conduct for which the defendant has previously been sentenced, in support of an 
allegation of felony stalking. In light of relevant precedent from Idaho and the United 
States Supreme Court, as well as persuasive precedent from other states that have 
confronted this issue, the answer to that question is yes. 
Clifford Stewart was charged with felony stalking based upon the State's 
allegation that he had sent a single email to the alleged victim, and further based upon a 
course of conduct that had formed the basis of Mr. Stewart's prior misdemeanor 
conviction for stalking involving the same victim. The State also alleged, but later 
dismissed, a charge of misdemeanor violation of a no contact order. Mr. Stewart filed a 
motion to dismiss the stalking charge based upon double jeopardy grounds. 
The district court denied Mr. Stewart's motion based upon a holding that, under 
the Blockburger test, the crime of felony stalking had one element that misdemeanor 
stalking did not and therefore the double jeopardy clause was not implicated. 
Mr. Stewart thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea that resewed the right to 
challenge on appeal the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the stalking 
charge. He timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence, and asserts 
that the district court committed legal error when it denied his motion to dismiss the 
felony stalking charge because this charge was brought in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment prohibition against a defendant be prosecuted a second time for an offense 
for which the defendant has already been sentenced. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs 
In August of 2007, Clifford Stewart pleaded guilty to misdemeanor stalking based 
upon his repeated contacts or attempts to contact a local television news anchor. 
(R., pp.10, 115.) A no contact order was issued in that case. (R., p.10.) Several 
months later, Mr. Stewart allegedly sent an email to the news anchor in which he 
wished her a "loveing new year" [sic] and asked for an autographed picture. (R., p.10.) 
When police contacted Mr. Stewart about the email, he told them that he had sent it, 
and further admitted that he was aware of the no contact order that had been issued in 
his prior case. (R., p.10.) Police then arrested Mr. Stewart for felony stalking. 
(R., p.10.) 
Mr. Stewart was charged with both first degree stalking and misdemeanor 
violation of a no contact order. (R., pp.32-33.) In the State's information, Mr. Stewart 
was charged with stalking based upon the allegation that he had written the alleged 
victim an email and, "had previously been convicted of this crime against the same 
victim within the last seven years." (R., p.32.) 
Thereafter, Mr. Stewart filed a motion to dismiss the stalking charge based upon 
the failure of the State to allege a course of conduct. (R., p.51.) At the hearing on this 
motion, defense counsel informed the district court that, according to counsel's 
understanding, the "course of conduct" that the State was seeking to rely upon in 
support of this charge was the prior course of conduct for which Mr. Stewart had already 
been sentenced in his prior misdemeanor stalking conviction. (Tr., p.6, L.25 - p.7, 
L.12.) Because Mr. Stewart had already pleaded guilty and been sentenced for this 
course of conduct, it would violate double jeopardy principles for this same course of 
conduct to be charged a second time in the State's new first degree stalking charges. 
(Tr., p.6, L.25 - p.7, L.12.) Mr. Stewart also noted that the affidavit in support of the 
information filed by the State omitted any allegation of a prior course of conduct and 
instead merely recited that Mr. Stewart had sent the alleged victim a single email when 
a no contact order was in place. (Tr., p.6, Ls.6-24.) The statute defining stalking 
required a course of conduct, which is defined as "repeated acts," and therefore the 
State's affidavit in support of the information, as well as the information itself, was 
insufficient to support the felony stalking charge. (Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.6, L.24.) 
The State asserted that the single email could stand as a course of conduct 
when viewed in conjunction with the other acts that formed the basis of the prior 
misdemeanor charge. (Tr., p.9, L.5 - p.10, L.23; p.16, L.12 - p.17, L.1.) Further, the 
State never disputed at this hearing that, with the exception of the single email sent 
after Mr. Stewart's misdemeanor stalking conviction, the "course of conduct" relied upon 
was the same conduct that formed the basis of the prior charge. (Tr., p.9, L.5 - p.19, 
L.14.) 
After the hearing, the district court entered an opinion and order that set forth its 
notice to the State of its intent to dismiss the stalking charge. (R., pp.68-73.) In this 
order, the district court clarified that it was treating Mr. Stewart's motion to dismiss as 
"an argument that the Amended Information is jurisdictionally defective because it does 
not plead facts in support of all of the elements of the crime charged." (R., p.69.) The 
district court found that the information filed by the State did not allege facts in support 
of all of the elements of aggravated stalking. (R., p.72.) Specifically, the State's 
Amended Information omitted any pleadings as to the facts in support of an allegation 
that Mr. Stewart had knowingly engaged in a course of conduct made criminal by the 
statute, that there was nothing setting forth a "course of conduct," and that there were 
no facts alleged in support of the element that the course of conduct would cause a 
reasonable person substantial emotional distress. (R., p.72.) The district court then 
provided the State with notice that it would dismiss the stalking charge against 
Mr. Stewart unless the State moved to amend its information within 14 days. (R., p.73.) 
The State filed a motion to amend the information against Mr. Stewart, which was 
granted by the district court. (R., pp.84, 92.) In the State's Second Amended 
Information, the State alleged a prior course of conduct that subsumed the course of 
conduct in Mr. Stewart's prior stalking case. (R., pp.94-95.) The State further alleged 
three bases in support of the elevated, first degree charge: (1) that Mr. Stewart had 
acted in violation of a no contact order; (2) that he had previously been convicted of 
another stalking charge within seven years; and (3) that Mr. Stewart had violated the 
conditions of his probation by committing the new stalking offense. (R., p.95.) 
In the affidavit in support of the second amended information, the State 
presented a further account of the course of conduct that led to Mr. Stewart's prior 
misdemeanor conviction for stalking. (R., pp.89-90.) Apparently, the series of contacts 
that were the basis of the prior charge began sometime in the Spring of 2006. 
(R., p.90.) According to the State's own affidavit, the prior stalking charge subsumed 
the contacts made by Mr. Stewart to the alleged victim, "between Spring 2006 to July 
30,2007." (R., p.90.) 
In the State's Suppiementai Discovery Response, the State provided notice to 
Mr. Stewart of the facts that it intended to rely upon in order to establish a "course of 
conduct," as required by I.C. § 18-7906. (R., pp.81-82.) All of the evidence that 
indicated a specific date on this notice related to the course of conduct which formed 
the basis of Mr. Stewart's prior misdemeanor conviction for stalking. (R., pp.81-82, 89.) 
Mr. Stewart filed a second motion to dismiss the State's charge based upon the 
failure to allege a new course of conduct. (R., p.97.) At the hearing on this motion, 
Mr. Stewart alleged that the State was required, pursuant to the plain language of 
I.C. §§ 18-7905 and 18-7906, to prove a new course of conduct rather than a single act. 
(Tr., p.28, L.24 - p.29, L.22.) Allowing the State to re-prosecute the same course of 
conduct that was previously tried and resulted in a conviction would violate the double 
jeopardy prohibitions contained in the Fifth Amendment, according to Mr. Stewart. 
(Tr., p.30, L.18-p.31, L.14.) 
The State took a slightly different posture at the hearing on Mr. Stewart's second 
motion to dismiss with regard to the question of the factual predicate for the prior 
misdemeanor stalking charge. The prosecutor attending this hearing admitted that he 
was "not personally aware of the factual basis of [Mr. Stewart's] conviction," but 
postulated that maybe the prior conviction did not subsume all of the facts that were 
alleged in support of the prior charge. (Tr., p.36, L.13 - p.17, L.9.) The State then 
argued that there might be no double jeopardy violation by speculating that, "some of 
these acts may not have been the basis of a conviction." (Tr., p.37, Ls.1-9.) As an 
alternative argument, the State asserted that the single contact should be deemed 
sufficient by the district court based on the policy argument that, "waiting until there are 
multiple contacts doesn't protect the victim." (Tr., p.37, L.10 - p.38, L.7.) 
The district court denied Mr. Stewart's motion to dismiss the stalking charge. 
(R., pp.104-109.) In doing so, the district court first found that the State had presented 
sufficient information in its Second Amended lnformation to allege a course of conduct. 
(R., pp.105-108.) For purposes of the motion, the district court accepted as true, "that 
the defendant has been convicted in Minidoka County of the misdemeanor stalking 
offense and that the Minidoka conviction arose out of the same course of conduct or 
acts that form the basis for the instant prosecution.'' (R., p.106.) Because the State's 
Second Amended lnformation expressly referenced more than one act, and because 
the district court did not find any discernible temporal limitation on what constitutes the 
series of acts for purposes of discerning a "course of conduct," the district court found 
that the State's information alleged a course of conduct. (R., pp.106-108.) 
The district court also held that Mr. Stewart's prosecution was not barred by 
double jeopardy. (R., pp.108-109.) Here, the district court's analysis was more cursory. 
The district court determined that, because first degree stalking had one more element 
than misdemeanor stalking, double jeopardy did not apply under the principles 
articulated in Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299 (1932). (R., pp.108-109.) 
Mr. Stewart entered a binding Rule 11 conditional guilty plea to first degree 
stalking, but reserved the right to challenge on appeal the district court's denial of his 
second motion to dismiss this charge. (Tr., p.61, L.6 - p.62, L.13; R., pp.134-136.) The 
State agreed to dismiss the misdemeanor charge of violation of the no contact order; 
and further agreed to a sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and probation 
contingent on the district court's acceptance of that agreement. (Tr., p.62, L.17 - p.65, 
L.22; R., p.134-135.) 
Mr. Stewart was sentenced to five years, with two and one-half years fixed. 
(Tr., p.101, Ls.15-22; R., pp.145-147.) The district court suspended this sentence and 
placed Mr. Stewart on probation for five years. (Tr., p.101, Ls.23-25; R., pp.145-147.) 
Mr. Stewart timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence. 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Stewart's motion to dismiss the felony 
stalking charge? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Stewart's Motion To Dismiss The Felony 
Stalkinq Charoe 
A. Introduction 
The State in this case was required to prove a "course of conduct" in support of 
its allegation that Mr. Stewart had committed first degree stalking. The evidence that 
the State was relying on in this case consisted of a single act - the sending of an email 
to the alleged victim - coupled with the course of conduct underlying Mr. Stewart's prior 
misdemeanor stalking conviction. Because Mr. Stewart had previously been convicted 
of, and sentenced for, this course of conduct, seeking to punish him for these same acts 
a second time violated Mr. Stewart's Fifth Amendment constitutional protection against 
being punished twice for the same offense.' 
6. Standard Of Review 
Whether a defendant has been twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. 
See, e.g., State v. Bush, 131 ldaho 22, 33, 951 P.2d 1249, 1260 (1997). Additionally, 
the question of whether a particular crime is a greater or lesser included offense of 
another for double jeopardy purposes is likewise a question of law that this Court 
reviews de novo. State v. Bryant, 127 ldaho 24,29,896 P.2d 350,355 (Ct. App. 1995). 
' Although Mr. Stewart's trial counsel referenced both "the U.S. and the ldaho 
Constitution," there was no argument below as to whether the ldaho constitution 
provides more protection than does the federal constitution with regard to protections 
afforded against double jeopardy. (Tr., p.34, Ls.3-14.) As such, the double jeopardy 
issue presented herein is analyzed solely with regard to the Fifth Amendment protection 
against double jeopardy. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Stewart's Motion To Dismiss The 
Charge Of Felony Stalkina Because This Charge Constituted A Violation Of The 
Fifth Amendment Prohibition Aqainst Prosecutina A Person Twice For The Same 
Offense, And, In Absence Of The Course Of Conduct For Which Mr. Stewart Had 
Previously Been Tried And Sentenced. There Was No Proof Of A Course Of 
Conduct As Required For A Conviction Of Felony Stalkinq 
1. The Unit Of Prosecution For The Offense Of Stalkinq Is A "Course Of 
Conduct", Which By Definition Requires Multiple Acts That Are Temporally 
Connected, And The Onlv Course Of Conduct Alleaed Bv The State In 
This Case Is A Sinale Act Coupled With The Prior Course Of Conduct For 
Which Mr. Stewart Had Previouslv Been Prosecuted 
A "unit of prosecution" is the manner in which a criminal statute permits a 
defendant's conduct to be divided into discrete acts for purposes of prosecuting multiple 
offenses. See Woellhaf v. People, 105 P.3d 209, 215 (Colo. 2005). Once the 
legislature defines the unit of prosecution for an offense, "that prescription determines 
the scope of protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id; see also Sanabria v. 
U.S., 437 U.S. 54, 69-70 (1978). To determine the unit of prosecution, appellate courts 
look exclusively to the statutes that define the offense. Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 215 
In this case, the State charged Mr. Stewart with stalking in the first degree 
pursuant to I.C. 3 18-7905. (R., pp.94-95.) This offense is defined as a violation of 
I.C. § 18-7906, which defines the offense of misdemeanor stalking, coupled with one or 
more enumerated aggravating circumstances. I.C. § 18-7905. A person is guilty of the 
general misdemeanor offense of stalking if he or she knowingly and maliciously 
engages in a course of conduct that either seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the 
victim and is such as would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress, 
or is such as would cause a reasonable person to be in fear of death or physical injury 
of a family or household member. I.C. § 18-7906(1). Therefore, in order to be guilty of 
stalking in any form, the State must necessarily prove a "course of conduct" as the 
actus reus under Idaho's statutory scheme - making a "course of conduct" the unit of 
prosecution for this offense. 
The legislature has defined "course of conduct" as, "repeated acts of non- 
consensual contact involving the victim or a family or household member of the victim, 
provided however, that constitutionally protected activity is not included within the 
meaning of this definition." I.C. § 18-7906(2) (emphasis added). Under the plain 
definition provided in this statute, a course of conduct necessarily requires more than 
one act. 
Here, the State charged Mr. Stewart with one act - the sending of an email to the 
alleged victim - coupled with the course of conduct that the State had previously relied 
on for Mr. Stewart's prior conviction of misdemeanor stalking. (R., pp.94-95.) The 
prosecutor at the hearing on Mr. Stewart's second motion to dismiss the stalking 
charge, who was - by his own admission - ignorant of the basis for the prior 
misdemeanor charge, hypothesized that, "some of these acts may not have been the 
basis of a conviction." (Tr., p.37, Ls.1-9.) However, the State's speculative postulation 
at this hearing is unsupported by the State's own affidavit presented in support of the 
felony stalking charge and by pertinent case law. 
As an initial matter, this Court may wish to note that the district court made a 
finding for purposes of the double jeopardy issue in this case that the course of conduct 
alleged by the State included the course of conduct that was the basis for Mr. Stewart's 
prior misdemeanor stalking conviction. (R., p.108.) And the district court's finding is 
correct in light of the State's own accounting of the evidence that it intended to prove at 
trial to establish the stalking charge, as well as pertinent case law clarifying the 
parameters for a course of conduct for double jeopardy purposes. 
In the Second Amended Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint, it is 
abundantly clear that the State is relying upon the course of conduct that formed the 
basis of the prior complaint, and that these acts were treated as a single course of 
conduct in the prior proceedings. After detailing facts regarding the single email sent by 
Mr. Stewart on December 31, 2007, and Mr. Stewart's arrest after admitting that he sent 
this email, Deputy Sheriff Randy Kidd set forth the incidents that formed the basis of 
Mr. Stewart's prior misdemeanor conviction. (R., pp.88-90.) After detailing the general 
nature of these incidents, Deputy Sheriff Kidd averred that, "On August 6, 2007, Clifford 
Stewart was charged with Second Degree Stalking in Minidoka County Case CR 2007- 
2759 for repeatedly displaying affection towards Gina Jameson by various means and 
on numerous occasions between Spring 2006 to July 30, 2007." (R., p.90) (emphasis 
added). This time period subsumes all of the allegations of prior acts that the State 
indicated it was relying on to establish a course of conduct other than the single email 
that was sent after Mr. Stewart pleaded guilty to misdemeanor stalking on August 23, 
2007. (R., pp.88-90.) 
The conclusion that the State was relying on those acts that were part of the 
course of conduct forming the basis for Mr. Stewart's prior misdemeanor stalking charge 
is further supported by consideration of the State's First Supplemental Discovery 
Response. (R., pp.81-82.) In divulging the documents that the State was intending to 
rely upon to prove Mr. Stewart had committed a course of conduct, the very first two 
documents listed are the criminal complaint filed in the prior misdemeanor case and the 
incident report from that case. (R., p.81.) The State also indicated its intent to 
introduce several emails written throughout the period of time that was alleged as the 
basis of the course of conduct in Mr. Stewart's prior misdemeanor conviction. 
(R., pp.81-82.) Based upon the State's own accounting of the evidence, other than the 
new email that was written after Mr. Stewart's prior conviction, the evidence that the 
State was intending to rely on was evidence of the same course of conduct for which 
Mr. Stewart had previously been sentenced. 
The ldaho Supreme Court has addressed the importance of the distinction of 
whether a course of conduct constitutes one offense or several offenses. In State v. 
Major, the Court noted that the distinction is important because, "to charge a defendant 
with two offenses when only one was committed violates the defendant's right against 
double jeopardy." State v. Major, 111 ldaho 410, 414, 725 P.2d 115, 119 (1986). The 
Major Court suggested pertinent considerations as to whether a course of conduct is a 
single incident, including whether the actions were undertaken as part of a common 
scheme or plan that reflected a single, continuing impulse or intent. Id. In this case, by 
definition the charge of stalking requires a course of conduct with a unified intent. 
Where the actions charged all demonstrate the requisite continuity required to establish 
a course of conduct, the actions alleged in the charges should be treated as a single 
unit of prosecution. 
Moreover, to the extent that the State suggested to the district court that it could 
retroactively seek to segregate the acts alleged in the prior course of conduct for which 
Mr. Stewart was sentenced, this suggestion is contrary to pertinent case law. In the 
United States Supreme Court case of Brown v. Ohio, the Court rejected an Ohio Court 
of Appeals determination that the conviction for lesser offense of joyriding could be 
segregated from the greater offense of grand theft merely, "because the charges 
against [the defendant] focused on different parts of his 9-day joyride." Brown v. Ohio, 
432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977). The Brown Court held that, "The Double Jeopardy Clause is 
not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitation by the simple 
expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units." Id; see 
also Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 72-73. This is particularly the case where, as here, the State 
seeks to retroactively impose an arbitrary segregation of the acts previously relied on for 
a defendant's conviction with the express purpose of reviving charges against the 
defendant that would otherwise be barred by double jeopardy principles. 
This is also in accord with case law from other jurisdictions confronted with the 
issue of segregation of the charges in the context of felony stalking charges. In 
Eichelberger v. State, the Florida District Court of Appeals was confronted with the 
issue of whether three separate convictions of aggravated stalking that were alleged to 
have occurred within the same time period violated the prohibition against multiple 
punishments under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Eichelberger v. State, 949 So.2d 358, 
359-360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). The Eichelberger Court held that these convictions 
violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Id. In doing so, the 
Eichelberger court noted: 
The State did not present evidence of any break in Eichelberger's course 
of conduct that would mark the end of one series of acts and the start of 
another, or the end of one form of contact and the start of another. 
Instead, the evidence established one course of conduct that was ongoing 
during the pertinent time period. As such, the proof supported a 
conviction of one count of aggravated stalking. 
Id. at 360. 
As in Eichelberger, the State's own account of the basis for Mr. Stewart's prior 
stalking conviction establishes only one course of conduct. Therefore, the suggestion 
made by the prosecutor that the State could retroactively seek to segregate these acts 
so as to support separate charges is not supported by the record in this case or by 
relevant case law. Given this, aside from the single act alleged of Mr. Stewart sending 
one email after his prior conviction, the course of conduct alleged by the State 
subsumed the same course of conduct that was the basis for his prior conviction. 
2. Prosecutina Mr. Stewart A Second Time For The Course Of Conduct That 
Formed The Basis Of His Prior Stalking Conviction Violates The Fifth 
Amendment Prohibition Against Prosecuting A Defendant A Second Time 
For An Offense For Which The Defendant Has Already Been Sentenced 
The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, as contained in the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, consists of three separate 
protections: (1) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal; (2) it protects against a prosecution for the same offense after a conviction; 
and (3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.' See, e.g., 
Illinois v. Vifale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980). It is the second of these three guarantees 
that is at issue in this case. Mr. Stewart asserts that, in seeking to rely on the facts that 
served as the basis for his prior stalking conviction in order to establish the course of 
conduct for a new stalking charge, the State has violated the constitutional prohibition 
against prosecuting him a second time for conduct for which Mr. Stewart has already 
been convicted and sentenced. 
' The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Illinois v. Vifale, 447 
U.S. 410,415 (1980). 
From the outset, it is necessary to clarifL that misdemeanor stalking and felony 
stalking are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes given the district court's 
erroneous conclusion to the contrary in this case. The district court determined that 
double jeopardy was not implicated under the Blockburger analysis because felony 
stalking had one or more additional elements than does misdemeanor stalking. 
(R., pp.108-109.) However, this conclusion stems from an incomplete Blockburger 
analysis and is plainly erroneous given that the offense of first degree stalking expressly 
subsumes the commission of the lesser offense of misdemeanor stalking as one of its 
elements. 
ldaho has adopted the Blockburger test to determine whether separate charges 
constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. See, e.g., Bryant, 127 ldaho 
at 29, 896 P.2d at 355. Under Blockburger, "the test to be applied to determine whether 
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact 
that the other does not." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added). This test 
requires the reviewing court to look at both of the offenses charged to make sure that 
each contains at least one element that the other does not. Otherwise, there is a single 
offense for double jeopardy purposes. Bryant, 127 ldaho at 29, 896 P.2d at 355. "If two 
offenses are the same under [the Blockburger] test for purposes of barring consecutive 
sentences at a single trial, they necessarily will be the same for purposes of barring 
subsequent prosecutions." Brown, 432 U.S. at 166. "The prohibition against double 
jeopardy has been held to mean that a defendant may not be convicted of both a 
greater and a lesser included offense." Bryant, 127 ldaho at 29, 896 P.2d at 355. To 
the extent that there is doubt as to whether two charged offenses constitute the same 
offense for double jeopardy purposes, the rule of lenity requires that the doubt be 
resolved in favor of the criminal defendant. Whalen v. U.S., 445 U.S. 684,694 (1980). 
While the district court correctly noted that first degree stalking contained 
elements that second degree stalking does not, the reverse cannot be said. Under 
I.C. 3 18-7905, first degree stalking has as one of its elements the commission of 
second degree stalking as defined in I.C. 3 18-7906. I.C. § 18-7905(1). It is therefore 
impossible for misdemeanor stalking to have an element that felony stalking lacks, since 
felony stalking subsumes misdemeanor stalking in its entirety. As such, these charges 
are considered the same offense for double jeopardy purposes under the Blockburger 
test, and the district court's conclusion that double jeopardy principles are inapplicable 
to the issues raised in this case is without merit. 
Applying double jeopardy principles to the facts of this case leads to the 
conclusion that Mr. Stewart was unconstitutionally prosecuted a second time for the 
conduct that formed the basis of his prior, second-degree stalking conviction. The 
United States Supreme Court Opinion in Brown makes clear that, "where ... a person 
has been tried and convicted for a crime which has various incidents included in it, he 
cannot be tried a second time for one of those incidents without being twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense." Brown, 432 U.S. at 168 (quoting In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 
176, 188 (1889)) (omission in the original). Additionally, it offends the constitutional 
prohibition against double jeopardy for the State to charge a defendant with the lesser 
offense, and then seek a second prosecution for the greater offense after the defendant 
has been convicted. Id. at 168-169. "Whatever the sequence may be, the Fifth 
Amendment forbids successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater 
and lesser included offense." Id. at 169. Here, the State sought to punish Mr. Stewart a 
second time for the incidents that formed the basis for his prior conviction of stalking. 
This violates Mr. Stewart's constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 
This is in accord with the holding of numerous other jurisdictions that have been 
confronted with this issue. See, e.g., Vazquez v. State, 953 So.2d 569 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2007); Kinney v. State, 477 S.E.2d 843, 846 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that 
charging defendant with aggravated stalking for conduct that formed basis of prior 
conviction for violating a no contact order violated constitutional protection against 
double jeopardy); Edge v. Commonwealfh, 883 N.E.2d 928, 930-932 (Mass. 2008) 
(prosecution of defendant for stalking based upon facts underpinning prior conviction for 
violating a no contact order violates constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy); 
State v. Vigil, 65 S.W.3d 26, 35-36 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). 
The decision in Vazquez is particularly instructive in this case. The defendant in 
Vazquez was charged, infer alia, with one count of aggravated stalking based in part on 
events that formed the basis of a stalking charge for which he had already been 
sentenced. Vazquez, 953 So.2d at 570. The only new basis for the stalking charge 
alleged by the State was a subsequent violation of a protective order. Id. at 570-571. 
There, as in this case, the defendant asserted that the State's reliance on the actions 
that formed the basis of a prior stalking charge in prosecuting a new stalking charge 
violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Id. The Vazquez Court 
agreed. Id. at 571. 
The Vazquez Court first found that these offenses were the same offense under 
the Blockburgertest. Id. While the State asserted that they were not the same offenses 
because aggravated stalking required proof of at least one additional element, the 
Vazquez Court rejected this argument, concluding that, "The two are not separate 
offenses under the Blockburger test because stalking does not contain an element that 
aggravated stalking does not." Id. As such, misdemeanor stalking was a lesser 
included offense of felony stalking. Id. 
The Vazquez Court then found that, under the record in that case, the two 
stalking convictions rested upon the same factual basis. Id. More specifically, the 
phone calls between the defendant and the alleged victim, "upon which the simple 
stalking charge was based, were used by the prosecution at trial in this case to prove 
the aggravated stalking charge." Id. The appellant was therefore convicted of stalking 
and of the later filed aggravated stalking charge based upon the same actions. Id. 
Because this violated the defendant's constitutional protection against double jeopardy, 
the Vazquez Court vacated the defendant's aggravated stalking conviction. Id. 
Here, as in Vazquez, Mr. Stewart's charges rested upon the same factual basis 
as did his earlier conviction for misdemeanor stalking. There was only one additional 
act alleged by the State other than the facts underpinning that earlier conviction. The 
State's second prosecution of Mr. Stewart based upon conduct for which he had 
previously been sentenced violated the constitutional prohibition against placing a 
defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense. 
In absence of the course of conduct that was the basis of Mr. Stewart's prior 
charge and sentence for stalking, the State in this case has only asserted a single act - 
that Mr. Stewart sent the alleged victim one emaii. (R., pp.94-95.) This does not meet 
with the requirement of a course of conduct as defined in 1.C. !j 18-7906 that there be 
repeated acts. IC. § 18-7906(2)(a). It is worth noting that the Fifth Amendment 
guarantees against double jeopardy are primarily a restraint on the power of the courts 
and prosecutors based upon principles of separation of powers. See Brown, 432, U.S. 
at 165. Once the legislature has defined the scope of an offense and fixed the 
punishment for it, "courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same 
offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more 
than one trial." Id. Although the legislature could have made alternate provisions for 
the commission of a subsequent stalking offense, the determination of the Idaho 
legislature is that the unit of prosecution remains the same - there must be a new 
course of conduct, which is defined as requiring more than one act. To allow 
prosecutors to circumvent the legislature's own definition of this offense by permitting 
proof of only one subsequent act ignores the plain language of the statute and violates 
those principles of separation of powers that the prohibition against double jeopardy 
seeks to further. As such, this Court should reverse the district court's denial of 
Mr. Stewart's motion to dismiss the first degree stalking charge and remand this case 
for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Stewart respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to dismiss the first degree stalking charge, and remand this case for 
further proceedings. 
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SARARE. TOMPKINY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Ejth day of August, 2009, 1 sewed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
CLIFFORD STEWART 
324 HWY 30 #I 
KIMBERLY ID 83341 
MICHAEL R CRABTREE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED COPY OF BRIEF 
TIM J SCHNEIDER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
11 1 WEST 15TH STREET 
PO BOX 188 
BURLEY ID 83318 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
